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Abstract: This paper provides a framework for analyzing the ontology underlying 
a given public policy, i.e. the categories and concepts used by the policy. It pro-
vides a set of questions concerning the language, logic and deontology of a policy 
and their development over time. The framework is applied to a particular case 
study, the valorization policy for Dutch universities, in order to suggest the use-
fulness of the framework in the design and normative evaluation of public policy.
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1  Introduction
Philosophers engage in various ways with public policy. Policy topics that have 
received philosophical attention include, e.g. environmental policy, treatment of 
the disabled, animal welfare and drugs (see, e.g. Wolff 2011). Philosophers have 
also asked more generally what the relationship between philosophy and public 
policy should be (Hook 1970; Buchanan 2009). Mostly, the philosophical subdis-
cipline that has been central in these treatments has been ethics, asking, e.g. 
what we should do about a particular policy problem from the perspective of a 
given ethical framework. The ethical discussions usually focus on how public 
policy intervenes (or should intervene) in the world. This paper, however, focuses 
on how policy represents the world by focusing on ontology rather than ethics.
An ontological analysis of public policy will focus on what entities and 
categories are postulated by a particular policy, and how these are supposed 
to relate to each other according to this policy. A refugee policy may create 
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various categories of refugees, various categories of safe and unsafe countries, 
and various categories of residency permits. A public health policy may refer to 
various kinds of nursing activities which are subcategorized, e.g. as medical, 
administrative or other. A policy regarding universities may develop various 
kinds of societal impact indicators which relate in complex ways to pre-existing 
concepts like patents, editorships of journals, etc., a case we will discuss in much 
more detail later.
Even though a policy’s most important consequence may not be how it repre-
sents the world, and even though a policy’s main aim will usually not be to rep-
resent the world as accurately as possible or to capture certain natural kinds, the 
categories a policy creates may influence how we think about the policy domain 
in important and complex ways.
This paper is meant to make two contributions. As its main contribution, it 
provides a general framework for what I shall call ontological policy reconstruc-
tion (Section 4). This framework consists of a number of questions we can ask of 
any policy in order to make its underlying ontological structure explicit. These 
questions will be grouped into three categories: (1) Questions about the ontology 
itself, relating to the language and logic of the policy, its concepts and how they 
relate to each other. (2) Questions about deontology and power, relating to the 
rights and permissions which the policy associates with these concepts, and the 
institutional power structure that gave rise to the ontology. (3) Questions about 
dynamics, relating to changes of the ontology (and deontology) over time.
Besides this methodological contribution, the paper also makes a second 
more substantive contribution (Section 5) which is to apply the framework devel-
oped to a particular case, namely the emerging valorization policy for Dutch 
universities. The concept of valorization, of creating societal value through 
knowledge, is an emerging concept for Dutch universities that is playing an ever 
more prominent role in decisions about research grants, hiring decisions and 
government subsidies for universities. Applying the framework to this case will 
not only illustrate how to make use of the framework, it will also generate new 
insights into the discussion about valorization at Dutch universities.
Why does a policy’s ontology matter? Firstly, the way a policy represents the 
world is part of how it intervenes in the world. As will be illustrated later, our clas-
sifications affect those classified. Secondly, when we view a policy as a legal or 
administrative text prescribing certain actions to be taken, it becomes clear that a 
policy can only intervene in the world given a certain representation of the world. 
In this sense, a policy’s ontology is logically prior to the actions it prescribes. For 
instance, we cannot have a policy aiming to protect private property without an 
ontology that makes the relevant property distinctions. Hence, investigating the 
space of possible ontologies also enlarges the space of possible policy options.
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In what follows, I will start by giving some examples of ontological issues in 
public policy (Section 2). The section will cover a number of authors from various 
academic disciplines who have written on these issues and the questions they 
have raised. Many of these questions will find their way into the framework devel-
oped in this paper. Section 3 then describes the various theoretical ingredients 
from philosophy and other disciplines that go into the framework for ontological 
policy reconstruction. Section 4 lays out the practical side of this framework, i.e. 
the questions that make up the framework. The framework is applied in Section 5 
to the case of the valorization of scientific knowledge at Dutch universities, after 
which Section 6 concludes the paper.
2  Ontology in Public Policy: Some Examples
The purpose of this section is two-fold: On the one hand, I would like to give 
some examples of how ontological issues play a role in public policy. These exam-
ples will give the reader a concrete idea of how ontological issues are important 
in public policy, and when setting out the framework for ontological analysis in 
Section 4, I will refer back to some of these examples. On the other hand, this 
section will also survey a number of authors from various fields who have carried 
out (part of) an ontological analysis of specific policy issues. Hence, the second 
aim of this section is to survey previous research on this topic.
Fricker (2006) looked at how new concepts get introduced into public dis-
course, using the examples of homosexuality and sexual harassment. In the case 
of sexual harassment, Fricker described the difficulties encountered by women 
to conceptualize a shared experience. Concepts were lacking to describe the 
experience of sexual harassment from women’s points of view, and the existing 
concepts (e.g. flirting) did not adequately express the meaning of the relevant 
social interactions from women’s perspectives because they express dominant 
male conceptions of the interaction. Before the introduction of the concept sexual 
harassment, Fricker claims there was a hermeneutical lacuna, situations which 
could not adequately be described or made sense of for a group of people that was 
at a hermeneutical disadvantage. She points out the hermeneutical inequality 
and powerlessness that may prevent certain groups from contributing to a soci-
ety’s underlying ontology. But only once the concept of sexual harassment exists 
are we able to consider policies dealing with it.
The concepts of homosexuality and sexual harassment discussed by Fricker 
can also be viewed as creating what Hacking (1995) calls human kinds, e.g. the 
homosexual. According to Hacking, human kinds are value-laden: we construct 
these human kinds, these ontological categories, because we are interested 
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in them for one reason or another. Hacking looks at the examples of teenage 
 pregnancy and child abuse, concepts constructed and investigated by the social 
sciences because we perceive these concepts to be useful in investigating situa-
tions we consider to be problematic. Hacking subsequently points out an impor-
tant feature of human kinds: They are subject to looping effects. Humans who 
are labeled often care about the label they receive, the label may affect their lives. 
A person categorized as suffering from multiple personality disorder (another 
example considered by Hacking) may look at himself differently, as suffering 
from a disease, and may subsequently associate with others he now considers 
to be similar to himself. This may in turn lead to behavioral changes which may 
force the scientists to rethink their description of symptoms of people suffering 
from multiple personality disorder. In short, classifying people changes them, 
which in turn means that we may need to rethink our classifications. Hence, our 
ontology is dynamic rather than fixed once and for all.
Stone (2012) discusses public policy from a political science perspective. In her 
chapter “Numbers”, she discusses the difficulties involved in counting, e.g. how 
many people are unemployed. When the policy aim is to reduce unemployment, 
the definition of the category unemployed is crucial: What about volunteer work, 
people who work 5 h per week, or people who work 30 h per week but would like to 
work more? These questions show that a concept such as unemployment suggests 
clear natural boundaries where there are none. Unemployment statistics are sen-
sitive to how precisely the category of unemployment is defined. Different politi-
cal groups will have different strategic reasons to use one definition rather than 
another, because they may desire the unemployment rate to come out high or low.
Stone also points out that before counting something we need to name it. 
While the category unemployed seems a natural one and pre-given, public policy 
is also about the introduction of new policy concepts like the precariat (Standing 
2011) which are put on the political agenda. According to Stone the introduction of 
such a new concept also creates a community, people may for the first time asso-
ciate themselves with other people in the same category, thereby creating new 
possibilities for identity formation and political action. Of course, this new label 
may or may not be found desirable by the people so labeled, so another question 
that arises is who has the power to introduce new policy concepts and determine 
their definition and application. Can people self-identify as, e.g. a member of the 
precariat, or is an outside agency in charge of determining whether or not the 
concept applies to a particular case? In either case, Stone points out that incen-
tive effects need to be taken into account: If belonging to a particular category is 
tied to receiving financial benefits, people will have an incentive to belong to the 
category, whereas the agency distributing the funds may have the opposite incen-
tive to have as few people as possible belong to the category.
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Yanow (1996) has studied the use of racial and ethnic categories in the 1990 
U.S. census. Yanow investigated how these categories were used in the census 
and what subcategories (e.g. White, Black, Eskimo) were used. Yanow asks who 
made these (sub)categories, and what the consequences of these categories are 
for policies such as affirmative action. Her interpretive policy analysis focuses 
on the meanings assigned to these categories by different actors or groups. She 
also considers logical questions: the categorization employed suggests nonover-
lapping categories and exhaustiveness, but are there people who do not fit into 
any category? Also, Yanow distinguishes marked from unmarked instances of a 
category: Unmarked instances are those considered to be normal or typical for 
the category, whereas the marked instances are considered different, unusual, 
special. According to Yanow, the central questions of what she calls category 
analysis should be the following:
“1. What are the categories being used in this policy issue? 2. What do elements have in 
common that makes them belong together in a single category? Does the categorical logic 
depend on one or more markings? 3. What, if any, elements do not fit, or does one (or more) 
appear to fit more than one category? Why (what are their characteristics, and how do these 
compare with the characteristics of the fitting elements)? 4. Do the elements as they are 
used in policy practices signal different meanings of category labels than what the category 
labels themselves appear to mean? 5. Is there a point of view from which those things implic-
itly asserted as belonging together are or could be seen as divergent?” (Yanow 2000, p. 51).
Bowker and Star (1999) present an extensive treatment of classification systems, 
covering many examples including race classification in South Africa under 
apartheid, the international classification of diseases and the more recent 
nursing intervention classification. They define a classification as “a spatial, 
temporal or spatio-temporal segmentation of the world” (p. 10). A classification 
creates a set of boxes with the following desiderata: There are consistent, unique 
classificatory principles in operation and these produce categories which are 
mutually exclusive and complete. But no matter which classification system is 
adopted, “[e]ach standard and each category valorizes some point of view and 
silences another” (p. 5). Our task is to analyze what the chosen categories are, 
what they make visible and invisible, who made them, and how they change in 
time or spread geographically. Of particular interest is the other category, since 
this category collects the cases which do not fit neatly into the classification 
system adopted. Bowker and Star also pay attention to the development of clas-
sifications over time: the past is indeterminate since at some future point of time 
we may decide to reclassify the past, by deciding that things we assumed to be 
in the same category in the past will be put into different categories in the future, 
or vice versa. Time also can lead to certain classifications becoming so ingrained 
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in our culture that reality converges with our classification, we cannot see other 
possible classifications anymore.
One example discussed in detail by Bowker and Star is the nursing inter-
vention classification (NIC). I will briefly mention some aspects of their analy-
sis of the NIC since these are relevant to the example of academic valorization 
activities to be discussed in Section 5. According to Bowker and Star, many 
nursing practitioners welcomed the introduction of a classification system. 
One reason was that to gain more equal standing with doctors, it was nec-
essary to make visible the positive effects of nursing work through scientific 
studies, but scientific studies would require (or at least benefit from) such a 
classification system, as measuring requires classification. The classification 
would help to make nursing work visible, and also to create a common lan-
guage for nursing. At the same time, such a classification also made nursing 
work more prone to social control and surveillance, for instance by supervisors 
and insurance agencies which can now monitor work in much more detail. 
The classification also will determine what records are kept of the work done: 
“Memory – individual and organizational – is in general filtered through clas-
sification systems” (p. 267).
3   Theoretical Background of Ontological Policy 
Reconstruction
Ontological policy reconstruction: analyzing and/or constructing a policy’s main concepts, 
their meanings and interrelations (ontology), as well as the power structure associated with 
these (deontology), and describing the development of these, ontology and deontology, 
over time (dynamics).
The purpose of this section is to explicate the different elements in this defini-
tion of ontological policy reconstruction (OPR). Reconstruction here can mean 
describing what already exists but was not visible yet, but it can also mean con-
structing anew in a different way. As this section will show, the ingredients or 
tools for this reconstruction come from different disciplines. The next section will 
then spell out OPR in more detail and more practically, so that it can be applied to 
concrete cases of public policy.
In the most general sense, ontology is the study of what there is. In this paper, 
the term will not be used to refer the study of whether the entities a policy postu-
lates really exist and in what way. Rather, it refers to the description of a policy’s 
internal ontology, the conceptual landscape underlying a policy. Besides policies, 
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also scientific theories come with certain ontologies (e.g. a physical theory that 
uses concepts such as atom, electron, etc. and relates these in certain ways), and 
artificial intelligence makes use of ontologies in constructing the semantic web 
(see. e.g. Smith 2004). Rather than simply providing information via visible text 
on web pages, the semantic web aims to provide information in a structured form 
via a specified syntax and semantics which can be processed by computers. Engi-
neers are constructing ontologies to describe the world, creating information, with 
the aim of creating a shared world view and a shared language for communication. 
Some researchers have also thought about criteria for assessing the quality of an 
ontology (see, e.g. Gomez-Perez 2001): consistency (are the axioms of the ontology 
logically consistent?), completeness (which aspects of the world are missing from 
the ontology?), conciseness (are there redundancies in the definitions?), expand-
ability (can new concepts easily be added to the ontology?) and sensitiveness (do 
small changes to the ontology create big effects?). Some of these criteria for evalu-
ating ontologies will be used in the framework presented in Section 4.
The fact that the ontologies used in policy usually pertain not to the physi-
cal but to the social world raises further issues which have become central in 
the recently developing philosophical area of social ontology. In this area, the 
work of Searle (1995, 2005, 2006) is particularly useful for the aims of this paper. 
Searle investigates the logical structure of social reality, in particular of institu-
tions like money and marriage which can feature in social facts. Searle’s account 
of this social reality points out that social reality comes with what he calls deontic 
powers, rights and obligations which are attached to certain roles associated 
with social institutional reality. Searle considers institutions to be enabling pre-
cisely because they create these new power relationships. For instance, if you are 
married, you may be entitled to certain fiscal rights and to certain obligations of 
care with respect to your partner. I will use Searle’s notion of deontic powers in 
the ontological analysis of public policy in two ways: On the one hand, ontologies 
arise in an institutional setup with associated deontic powers, and this raises the 
question which actors have the power to create and institute the ontology. On 
the other hand, in the domain of public policy, ontologies are used in order to 
link them to certain policy consequences. This link between ontology and policy 
actions can be captured in terms of the deontic powers associated with the differ-
ent concepts postulated by the ontology. Both of these deontological aspects of 
ontologies will be developed in Section 4.
In contrast to Searle, Foucault has taken a more critical view of the powers 
associated with ontologies, or to use his terminology and book title, the order 
of things (Foucault 1966). The deontic powers which come with our constructed 
concepts can also have the purpose of disciplining people, as Foucault has illus-
trated, e.g. in his study of the prison system (Foucault 1975). Still, Searle and 
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Foucault agree in pointing out the importance of looking at the powers attached 
to our ontologies. Note that when I use the term deontology in this paper, I do 
not refer to an ethical theory usually associated with Kant. Instead, drawing on 
Searle, I refer to the rights and obligations associated with the ontology, and in 
line with Foucault, our deontological analysis will also consider the incentives 
created by these rights and obligations.
The last element needed for our framework is an appreciation of the dynam-
ics of ontologies. Giddens (1976) has introduced the notion of double herme-
neutics as characteristic of the social sciences: The social sciences interpret 
the social world which is made up of entities which themselves are interpretive 
beings. Human beings are hermeneutic beings, they develop ideas and concepts 
to describe their world. The social scientist’s concepts supervene on this first her-
meneutic layer, but more importantly, the social scientist’s second-level concepts 
will in turn influence the first-level concepts of the human beings studied. This is 
because concepts from the social sciences can be taken up by human beings and 
become part of how they see themselves. What this means is that our account of 
ontologies in public policy must also pay attention to the development of ontolo-
gies and their associated deontological powers over time.
To conclude, taking all the ingredients introduced in this section together, we 
can take an ontology to be a set of logically related concepts formulated in some 
(policy) language. We may either ourselves be involved in constructing this ontol-
ogy (as illustrated by the case of the semantic web), or we may be analyzing the 
construction of someone else (as illustrated by the valorization case of Section 5). 
Either way, the things we should pay attention to are the same: Besides paying 
attention to the ontology itself, we must look at the associated deontology and at 
their development over time. How to do this concretely is the topic of the follow-
ing section.
4  Ontological Policy Reconstruction in Practice
As Section 2 has demonstrated, many different kinds of questions can be asked 
about the ontology underlying a given public policy. The framework for onto-
logical analysis proposed in this section brings some order to this multitude of 
questions by locating them at different conceptual levels. The most basic level 
is the level of ontological language. Building on this level we get the level of 
logical relations between the different concepts. These two levels of analysis 
are similar to what in ethnography has been called the taxonomic analysis of 
a cultural domain (Spradley 1980). The third level deals with deontic questions 
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concerning the  ontology, power issues associated with certain concepts and with 
the ontology itself. Fourth and finally, there is the level of dynamics which deals 
with changes in the ontology over time. The remainder of this section describes 
these four levels and the relevant questions of ontological analysis associated 
with each level.
4.1  Language
Ontologies make the invisible visible through the language they use for describ-
ing the world. For a regular citizen, the most tangible artefact where the ontology 
of a policy becomes real is the form. For instance, an immigrant in the Nether-
lands may be asked to fill in a form asking for his name, sex, nationality and 
country of birth, and a citizen of the United States was asked about his race in the 
census of 1990. A person applying for social security benefits may be asked for 
psychiatric illnesses, his employment status and the income of family members. 
The questions used (e.g. concerning race, nationality, psychiatric illness) and the 
options to choose from (e.g. Black, German, ADHD) make the language of the 
policy’s underlying ontology explicit.
More precisely, forms present an individual with a policy language which 
contains a number of first- and higher-order predicates. The person filling in 
the form may designate himself to be an instance of the listed first-order predi-
cates (e.g. Black, male, German). Furthermore, the form itself designates these 
first-order predicates to be instances of other second-order predicates (e.g. 
race, sex, nationality). Relevant questions to ask at the level of language are 
the following:
 [1] Concepts: What are the central first- and higher-order predicates used by 
the policy to describe the world? For instance, race, nationality, caucasian, 
etc.
 [2] Conceptual Neighborhood: What other predicates could have been chosen 
that are closely related to the chosen ones? For instance, cultural-identity, 
African-American, etc.
 [3] Meanings: What (if any) are the meanings associated with these predi-
cates by different people and communities? For instance, what do the 
people categorized as Black (by who?) associate with the predicate, or with 
race?
 [4] Conceptual Gaps: What concepts are absent, not named explicitly or left 
invisible? For instance, a policy may not have the concept intersex but instead 
only refer to male and female.
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4.2  Logic
Besides providing a language with concepts to talk about the world, an ontol-
ogy also specifies the logical relations between many of these concepts. As 
 mentioned above, a form may postulate the sex an individual may identify with 
as male or female. Note that this ontology of the sexes is not pre-given by the 
world: As pointed out by Mol (1998), there are at least three ways to determine 
biological sex, hormonally, genetically and anatomically, and since these crite-
ria do not always yield the same result, there are at least eight possible sexes. 
A policy relying on this dualistic ontology thus makes this biological diversity 
invisible.
Consider another example from the 1990 US census discussed by Yanow 
(2000, p. 52). Here, the language contained second-order predicates like race, 
 ethnicity and sex, and first-order predicates like White and Black. In the 1990 
census, an individual could only associate himself with a single race. In the US 
census of 2000, this restriction was dropped, however, and people could associ-
ate themselves with more than one race.
Note that so far all the examples have used monadic predicates only. An ontol-
ogy can, however, also contain predicates which take more than one argument. 
An example of a binary predicate relevant for policy purposes is the concept is-a-
fiscal-partner-of which in Dutch law is different from both is-married-to and is-a-
registered-partner-of, two other examples of binary predicates.
Finally, in practice, a policy may be operationalized in different ways, reveal-
ing different definitions of key concepts. Mol (1999) considers the example of 
anaemia, a medical condition which in actual medical practice is operational-
ized in three different ways (according to Mol): The clinical definition (Mol calls 
it the clinical performance) links it to a doctor observing symptoms of tiredness, 
unusual color of the eyelids and skin. The laboratory definition links the term to 
a low haemoglobin level in a person’s blood when compared to a mean level for 
some population. And the pathophysiological definition judges the haemoglo-
bin level to be low when it is insufficient for this particular individual to prop-
erly transport oxygen. These three definitions are not equivalent, and a policy to 
reduce the occurrence of anaemia might use one or more of these definitions in 
its underlying ontology. The following questions summarize the relevant issues 
pertaining to a policy’s underlying background theory:
 [5] Definitions: How does the policy define its central first- and higher-order 
concepts?
 [6] Alternatives: What other definitions are conceivable for a given predicate? 
For instance, we might consider to include a third intersex option in the defi-
nition of sex.
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 [7] Non-overlap: Are the categories employed non-overlapping, and are they 
supposed to be non-overlapping? Are there cases which fit into more than 
one category? For instance, the 1990 US census assumed non-overlapping 
racial categories whereas the census of 2000 did not.
 [8] Completeness or Exhaustiveness: Do the categories employed cover the 
whole spectrum of possibilities, or are there instances which do not fit into 
any category? For instance, male and female may not cover the whole spec-
trum of possibilities for sex.
 [9] The Other: Which instances end up in the other category, provided there 
is such a category? For instance, when  reverend Lovejoy in the Simpsons 
referred to the friends and neighbors of Homer as “Christian, Jew, or...miscel-
laneous”, it was the Hindu Apu who ended up in the other category.
 [10] Finegrainedness: Which categories are rich in detail and have many sub-
categories and which categories are unrefined? For instance, a policy may 
make fine-grained distinctions within Christianity between Roman Catholic, 
Russian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox and Anglican, while not making any dis-
tinctions within Islam.
4.3  Deontology
The questions raised in the previous two sections suffice to deal with ontology 
proper, the categories used by a policy and the way these logically relate to each 
other. But policies are relevant to people’s lives not primarily because they clas-
sify people, things and activities into different categories, but because this cat-
egorization will impose on people certain obligations (e.g. paying taxes or fees) 
or entitle them to certain rights (e.g. claiming unemployment benefits or being 
eligible for affirmative action). These rights and obligations may attach to catego-
ries of people or to categories of activity. As an example of the latter, a person per-
forming an activity classified as pollution may incur the obligation to pay a fine. 
This deontological aspect of public policy supervenes on the ontology, not in the 
sense that there is any necessary connection between ontology and deontology, 
but simply in the sense that one aspect of a policy is that it adds a deontologi-
cal layer to its ontology. I will call this the deontological output of the underly-
ing ontology, the rights and obligations associated with the different ontological 
categories.
In contrast, there is also the deontological input of an ontology: Who 
has or had the right to create these categories and to define them, to decide 
on this ontology rather than another? The ontology used in a policy is usually 
an outcome of a process that involves various stakeholders: politicians, policy 
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makers, lobbyists, interest groups, companies, etc. There may be fights about 
what category label to use (e.g. Black, African American, African-American, 
Negro, person of color, etc.) and different people may use different labels in 
different contexts. In the end, however, a policy will have decided on certain 
category labels, on certain definitions for these categories, and on certain rela-
tions between categories, and it is important to analyze who were the powerful 
actors in coming to this ontology.
Put differently, deontological output is about the powers the policy generates 
through the ontology, whereas deontological input considers the powers going 
into the creation of the ontology. Without output deontology, the ontology would 
have no policy effects; without input deontology, the ontology would not be there 
in the first place. The relevant questions regarding deontology are:
 [11] Input: Who has/had the right or the institutional power to determine the 
ontology? First, choosing the category labels, for instance Black rather than 
African or African-American, or Race rather than Ethnicity; second, choosing 
the category definitions.
 [12] Output: First, for each category defined in the previous section, what (if 
any) obligations and permissions does the policy create? For instance, what 
rights and obligations are associated with the category unemployed? Second, 
how will this deontological structure discipline or incentivize people? For 
instance, a research policy which categorizes scientific publications into A-, 
B- and C-publications may force people into a certain publication behavior by 
creating publication obligations.
4.4  Dynamics
Concepts are not timeless, but they arise at a certain historical moment and they 
may disappear into oblivion later (Hacking 2002). Throughout its life, the meaning 
of a concept may change. The same holds for concepts which are associated with 
public policies. Consider the example of policies dealing with mental health and 
psychological illnesses. A concept of relatively recent origin is attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, ADHD. This concept arose within the psychological com-
munity at a certain point, and over the course of time, its meaning changed, e.g. 
in moving from DSM-4 to DSM-5. Whereas the previous three sorts of questions 
all treat the (de)ontology underlying public policy as static, in this subsection, we 
consider ontology as dynamic, changing for various reasons.
As we saw earlier, classification itself may alter the people classified (looping 
or reactivity effects), thereby necessitating a modification of the classification in 
the future. Furthermore, our classifications change with time because our interests 
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change, and scientific research may lead us to change our views about what is 
similar and what is different. For example, a classification of people based on 
anatomic features may be replaced by a different one based on genetic similarity. 
Also, there may be rival ontologies in use, competing against each other, where 
over time one ontology will become dominant. Alternatively, different ontologies 
may coexist next to each other. This ontological multiplicity (Mol 1999) was illus-
trated earlier with the three different definitions of anaemia where the same com-
munity may work with multiple ontologies which sometimes coexist peacefully, 
sometimes conflict and sometimes depend on each other.
Not only our concepts change over time, but so do the associated rights and 
duties, and more generally the institutional framework in which these concepts 
are embedded. As an example, students with ADHD may at some point be given 
the right to ask for more time to complete an exam, and people who have sexually 
harassed somebody else may be obliged to take a training course. Summarizing 
this discussion, the dynamic dimension of public policy gives rise to the follow-
ing questions:
 [13] Synchronic: Are there different ontologies present at the same time in 
different (sub)communities? How do these interact and co-exist with each 
other? Examples are different definitions of concepts like sex and anaemia 
that may coexist in the medical community.
 [14] Diachronic: How do the answers to the previous questions concerning 
language, logic and deontology change over time? For instance, new names 
or definitions for concepts get introduced at certain points in time: When did 
these concepts come to be introduced, by who, and why? Does the defini-
tion supplant a pre-existing alternative definition? For instance, a policy may 
define scientific excellence in terms of moral behavior, supplanting a previ-
ous definition in terms of scientific output.
 [15] Reactive: How do the people classified react to the ontology? How does 
this knowledge of their classification change people and the ontology over 
time? For instance, a policy evaluating research quality in terms of the 
number of publications may lead researchers to publish as much as possi-
ble (deontological output, incentive effect), and this may in turn lead policy 
makers to revise their definition and measurement of research quality.
5  Academic Valorization Case Study
One of the current discussions at Dutch universities concerns the societal impact 
of academic knowledge. The Dutch term valorisatie is central in this discussion 
which we shall translate here simply as valorization, roughly meaning the crea-
Brought to you by | University of Groningen
Authenticated
Download Date | 5/30/17 9:25 AM
316      Marc Pauly
tion of societal value from academic knowledge. In this section, I shall highlight 
an aspect of this discussion which deals with valorization indicators which aim 
to measure different valorization activities. The development of these indica-
tors is essentially the creation of a valorization ontology, and thus it provides us 
with an example for applying the general framework just outlined. Note that the 
purpose of this section is neither to give a full analysis of the Dutch discussion 
about valorization, nor even to provide a full analysis of the underlying valoriza-
tion ontology. Instead, the purpose of this section is to illustrate the general OPR 
framework presented in Section 4, and to see whether this framework can help us 
to generate interesting insights about policy making with respect to valorization 
at Dutch universities.
5.1  Case Description
Starting in the 1970s, science shops opened at different Dutch universities. Their 
aim was to allow citizens to approach universities with their questions. Valori-
zation in this sense was aiming to bring science closer to the citizens, making 
it more democratic. In the subsequent decades, valorization became more top-
down and was focusing less on knowledge transfer to the citizen and more on 
knowledge transfer to industry and businesses. In 2005, the law on higher educa-
tion and scientific research made valorization the third main task of universities 
besides teaching and research. While this law was still quite vague concerning 
the meaning of valorization, in december of 2011, the association of Dutch univer-
sities (VSNU) and the national ministry of education, culture and science (OCW) 
came to a number of performance agreements concerning teaching, research and 
valorization. Valorization is defined here as
the process of value creation from knowledge, deriving from all disciplines, by making knowl-
edge appropriate and available for economic and societal use and to translate it into prod-
ucts, services, processes and new industries. (OCW-VSNU 2011, p. 6, my translation from 
Dutch original).
The aim was to create a valorization-infrastructure by 2015. The universities 
agreed to develop valorization indicators in collaboration with the government 
which in the long run should be used to measure valorization. Concretely, these 
indicators were supposed to be used to make visible how universities meet the 
governmental demand of spending at least 2.5% of public research money on val-
orization activities in 2016. At that time, new agreements would be made concern-
ing the required output with respect to valorization.
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Subsequent to this agreement, VSNU worked out the valorization indicators 
(VSNU 2013a,b). The idea was that these indicators form a choice menu: univer-
sities could choose which of these indicators they wanted to use, and different 
disciplines could also choose different indicators. The VSNU indicators essen-
tially follow the framework developed by the European Commission (Finne et al. 
2011). The European Commission’s framework divides knowledge transfer (i.e. 
valorization) into three categories: (1) knowledge transfer through trained people 
(VSNU relabeled this category as simply People), (2) institutional co-operation in 
R&D and other phases of innovation (VSNU label: Cooperation), and (3) commer-
cialization of research (VSNU label: Results). The VSNU framework adds a fourth 
category: This category is unlabeled, but according to VSNU (2013a) it is added 
for two reasons: On the one hand, to allow room for future developments in our 
ideas about valorization which might require additional indicators. On the other 
hand, the authors doubt that the three other categories allow enough room for 
valorization as conceived of in the humanities and the social sciences. The report 
does, however, not go into any further detail about what such criteria might be.
The ontology which emerges from this discussion and these reports can be 
summarized as follows: The central activities of an academic are of three kinds: 
teaching, research and valorization. As for valorization, activities can be divided 
into four categories: People, Cooperation, Results and Other. Within the first 
three categories, VSNU adds further subcategories. For instance, for the category 
Cooperation, the four subcategories are: Contracts (4 indicators, e.g. number of 
research contracts in cooperation with public partners), Funding (12 indicators, 
e.g. financial contribution by companies to research in euros per year), Coopera-
tion (20 indicators, e.g. presence science park) and Publications (16 indicators, 
e.g. number of contributions to exhibitions). What insights can OPR as presented 
in the previous section reveal about this ontology?
5.2  Ontological Analysis
Language: The central concept is valorization, in the context of policy making 
it works as a first-order predicate which labels certain activities as valorization 
activities [1]. The Dutch term valorisatie originates in the financial and economic 
domain and still has this connotation [3]. Alternative terms that occasionally get 
used are knowledge transfer and societal impact [2], where especially the latter 
has fewer economic connotations. Among the four categories of valorization, 
note that the VSNU decided to use the term Results for the category that used to 
be called commercialization of research in the EU report [1&2]. This re-labeling 
corresponds to a moderate change in the category’s indicators: While the EU 
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report covered only licenses, patents and spin-offs in this category, the VSNU 
framework also allows for products and services for the public sector such as 
governmental agencies. What remains unnamed in the VSNU report [4] is the 
fourth category Other which is supposed to add flexibility for future develop-
ments and for the humanities and social sciences. Here we see the emergence of 
something that did not exist in the EU report but which still remains unnamed 
and unspecified.
Logic: Valorization policy defines university activities as of three categories: 
research, teaching and valorization [5]. The general definition of the central term 
valorization was given above, and valorization activities are then defined by the 
hierarchy of indicators mentioned. Regarding non-overlap [7], note that the dif-
ferent indicators are not meant to be mutually exclusive but rather as a menu of 
possibilities universities can choose from. For instance, within the People subdo-
main of valorization, there is one indicator counting the number of PhDs working 
in industry and another indicator counting the number of people with advanced 
degrees working in industry. Since PhDs are advanced degrees, these indicators 
are overlapping, but overlap is intended here. A problematic kind of overlap is the 
fact that the subdomain Cooperation contains a subdomain which is itself called 
Cooperation. This may indicate that we are dealing here with a subcategory of 
activities which do not fit anywhere else, a subcategory Other [9] within the Coop-
eration category which covers other cooperation activities. Regarding complete-
ness [8], the VSNU framework includes the fourth category Other as a subdomain 
of valorization next to People, Results and Cooperation. This is intended to make 
the classification complete, but no concrete examples are given of activities that 
might fit into this category. In fact, it is very difficult to come up with examples 
to classify as Other: Typical examples of valorization activities in the humanities 
like writing a review of a play for the newspaper, contributing to an art exhibition, 
giving an interview for television, or participating in a governmental advisory 
committee, all these activities already fit into the category Cooperation and are 
covered explicitly by existing indicators. Regarding alternative ontologies [6], a 
radically different vision of valorization might see teaching and research as par-
ticular kinds of valorization activities rather than as alternatives to valorization. 
But even without considering such drastic alternatives, many different ways of 
classifying valorization activities are imaginable and have been proposed in the 
literature. In the Netherlands, the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (KNAW) has 
published a report dealing with valorization in the humanities (KNAW 2012), 
where, e.g. prizes received from non-academic organizations (which VSNU puts 
into the category Cooperation) do not count as a valorization activity but rather 
as a sign of societal recognition. Finally, regarding finegrainedness [10], of the 
three categories, the category Cooperation has the largest number of indicators 
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to choose from. This is because the category is very heterogeneous, covering, e.g. 
contributions to exhibitions but also the presence of a science park.
Deontology: Looking first at deontological output [12], which rights and obli-
gations are associated with the categories of the valorization ontology? Since at 
the time of writing this ontology is still in development and not implemented yet, 
it is difficult to answer this question precisely. However, the general direction is 
clear: Once a university or faculty has adopted certain indicators, academics will 
be asked (required, obliged) to increase their activities falling under these indi-
cators, or performing certain kinds of valorization activities will incur a person 
certain benefits (rights). Hence, these valorization indicators are meant to incen-
tivize or discipline the academic’s activities. Turning towards the deontological 
input side [11], we look at how this ontology arose and the rights and powers of 
the different stakeholders involved. The demand for a valorization agenda comes 
from the Dutch government, it is not the researchers or the universities them-
selves that have been pushing for this. The agreement regarding the  valorization 
 framework was made between VSNU and OCW, so between the universities and 
the government. VSNU has (so far) secured many rights to the universities, in 
particular the choice of indicators to employ, and how to operationalize these 
indicators. In describing the genesis of its valorization framework, VSNU names 
as stakeholders the biggest Dutch employers’ organization VNO-NCW, OCW, 
the ministry of economics (EZ), and finally the national valorization committee 
(LCV). LCV is steering the valorization agenda in the period from 2009 to 2016, 
and it is made up of representatives of the following organizations: the technol-
ogy foundation STW, EZ, the Dutch federation of university medical centers, 
KNAW, the research center of the University of Wageningen, the Dutch National 
Science Organization, the technology transfer organization TNO, the organiza-
tion of institutions for higher vocational training (HBO-raad), the Dutch business 
organizations MKB-Nederland and VNO-NCW, the big technological institutes, 
VSNU, and OCW. Looking at these stakeholders, it is clear that technology and 
business organizations are well represented on this committee, while organiza-
tions more focused on the humanities, democratic citizenship or the social 
sciences are absent.
Dynamics: Whereas before 2005, the tasks of an academic were defined 
as research and teaching, the law passed in 2005 added valorization as a third 
dimension. Research proposals submitted to the Dutch national science founda-
tion NWO now also have to say something about valorization, and some propose 
that valorization should also become part of annual job evaluation talks for aca-
demics. The definition of valorization also underwent some changes [14]: As the 
VSNU (2013a) report notes, the original definition of valorization used by LCV 
and others was more business-oriented than the definition eventually adopted 
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by VSNU. With respect to the valorization indicators, these have been extended 
beyond what was proposed in the EU report to make more room for the humani-
ties and social sciences. The indicators are still in development, and it is not clear 
which ones will be adopted by which universities. For this reason, it is also too 
early to notice reactivity effects [15], i.e. if and how these indicators will influence 
valorization behavior of academics. One may predict, however, that the obliga-
tions associated with these valorization indicators will increase. The freedom of 
choice the VSNU framework provides does, however, suggest that there will be a 
multiplicity of valorization frameworks in use at Dutch universities in the future 
[13], different research communities using different valorization (sub)ontologies.
Within the university, the claim is sometimes heard that valorization policy 
is driven by industry. Looking at the stakeholders in charge of determining the 
valorization ontology, this claim is largely confirmed. At the same time, the ontol-
ogy proposed by VSNU as the backbone of valorization policy is very broad: it 
involves a lot of different overlapping categories, so many, in fact, that it is diffi-
cult even in the humanities to think of valorization activities which do not fit into 
one of the first labeled categories. And otherwise, there is always still the fourth 
unlabeled category. So completeness does seem to have been achieved. The fact 
that the ontology functions as a superontology from which specific universities 
and faculties can choose subontologies weakens the disciplining power that this 
ontology will impose on academics. So the picture that emerges is that while the 
government tries to impose a more business-oriented discipline on the universi-
ties, the universities so far have managed to broaden the valorization ontology 
and to retain some freedom as to what parts of the ontology they want to adopt, 
and what kinds of societal impact they want to make visible. To what extent this 
freedom will be curtailed in the future remains to be seen.
6  Conclusions
In the area of public policy, discussion usually focuses on the aims of the policy, 
and on whether it will have the desired effects. These discussions usually take 
for granted the ontological layer underlying the policy, but I hope that this paper 
has shown that this underlying ontological layer is also important in the analy-
sis and creation of public policy. The aim of this paper was to provide a frame-
work for such an ontological reconstruction of public policy, and to illustrate the 
application of this framework to valorization policy at Dutch universities. I also 
tried to motivate the elements of this framework (language, logic, deontology 
and dynamics), without trying to argue that this framework is the only possi-
ble one. The elements mentioned seem to me natural elements to consider, but 
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I expect the framework to evolve. The framework and its questions will have to 
demonstrate their usefulness in the actual analysis and construction of public 
policy.
When it comes to applying ontological policy analysis in practice, we are 
faced with the question of what to include in our ontology and what to exclude. 
For an extreme example, consider an ontological analysis of refugee policy that 
involves analyzing a form that refugees need to fill in. Suppose this form includes 
the line “Please use a pencil to fill in this form”. Does this mean that the refugee 
policy ontology has to include pencils? There is no general answer to this ques-
tion. Just as the scientist has to choose what aspects of reality to include in her 
model, a person analyzing policy similarly has to choose which aspects of the 
policy domain to include in her analysis, how to (re-)construct the policy domain. 
This is part of the creative and open-ended character of science, policy making 
and policy analysis.
Let me end with some more personal considerations that motivated my 
 interest in the ontological analysis of policy, considerations that might yield 
another argument for the importance of an analytical tool like the one described 
in this paper. I observe around me a loss of ontological diversity, a lamentable 
consequence of globalization that has unfortunately received little attention 
when compared to other losses of diversity such as the degradation of biodi-
versity or linguistic diversity. In a globalized world where technologies tend to 
make unification and uniformity much easier to realize, a critical evaluation of 
our ontologies is becoming ever more important. In the interest of global com-
munication and business, the ontology that is being created right now for the 
semantic web will first become the one way we look at the world, and after this 
ontology will have become entrenched, it will have become the world itself. Via 
double-click information (Latour 2003), the work done by ontologists will have 
become invisible, and therefore beyond the reach of critical discussion and pos-
sibly change. In line with Michel Serres (Bowker and Star 1999, p. 321), I see one 
task of philosophy as undoing this convergence, to re-open our classifications 
and point to alternative possibilities that have been realized in the past or that so 
far have not been realized at all.
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